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I. INTRODUCrION
International legal scholarship has long suffered from too much normative
theorizing and too little positive analysis about how the international legal
system actually works. This inattention to the empirical and descriptive has
alienated international legal scholars from their colleagues in political science
departments and lent much of international law scholarship an utopian air.
Whatever the historical source of this state of affairs, however, it is rapidly
fading. A new generation of scholars, steeped in a variety of social scientific
methodologies, has turned its sights on international law and is actively
employing positive theories of state behavior to enhance legal analyses. These
scholars have also begun to undertake empirical studies in an effort to provide
support for their theoretical claims. The latest, and certainly the most
ambitious, effort is The Limits of International Law,' a new book in which Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner, using game theoretic models and rational choice
methodology, claim to offer a "comprehensive" theory of international law.2
The use of rational choice to explain state behavior is not new.
International relations theorists have long used game theory and rational choice
methodologies to model and explain the conduct of states. In recent years,
moreover, they have begun to focus on international law as an important
domain of state interaction. Thus far, however, most of their attention has
been directed to major multilateral treaty regimes. Perhaps the most original
part of Goldsmith and Posner's book is its extended effort to develop and
apply game theoretic models to the less known realm of customary
international law and to undertake detailed case studies to determine whether
the predictions of their models are borne out in actual state practice.3
I certainly applaud this project. While I am doubtful that rational choice
approaches will ever provide a fully satisfactory positive account of
international law, the careful deployment of such methodologies can provide
useful insights and offer a needed corrective to some of the less grounded
normative claims prevalent in contemporary international law scholarship. It
is long overdue for the international law academy to take seriously cognate
disciplines which have sought to provide systematic accounts of state behavior.
Nevertheless, Goldsmith and Posner's treatment of the subject is seriously
' JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIc A. POSNER, THE LnITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
2 Id. at 4, 17.
' This assessment is consistent with their own. See id. at 17.
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flawed and incomplete, and I fear that its most lasting contribution will be as
a spur to others.
I focus in this Essay on their treatment of customary international law.4
Without putting too fine a point on it, Goldsmith and Posner offer a rather
bleak assessment of the capacity of customary international law to play a role
in stabilizing interstate relations. Indeed, the overall message of the book
seems to be that states are well advised not to place much faith in customary
international law when determining how to conduct their affairs. This
skepticism rests upon two principal hypotheses. The first is that states are
exclusively motivated by self-interest and never by a desire to comply with
international law or by moral concerns. Their second, which is purportedly
entailed by the first, is a combination of specific claims tied to a pervasive
sense of pessimism. Roughly speaking, they believe that, because states follow
only their self-interest, customary international law can at most enforce--or
rather reflect-a weak and fragile equilibrium, which will quickly disintegrate
in the face of changes in background conditions or in the distribution of power.
According to Goldsmith and Posner, states will not reliably comply with
customary international law.
I consider below both the theoretical and the empirical aspects of
Goldsmith and Posner's project. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however,
The Limits of International Law is not, at core, a theoretical book. Goldsmith
and Posner do develop a game theoretic framework, chock full of technical
jargon, for analyzing international law. But, as they implicitly recognize, their
game theory models are meaningful only if, and to the extent that, they can be
empirically verified. Consequently, they devote the greater part of their
discussion to four historical case studies which, they claim, provide the
necessary empirical support for their two principal hypotheses.5
I begin by addressing the authors' theoretical apparatus, pointing to a
number of reasons to doubt whether their models provide a solid basis for the
pessimistic predictions which they draw from them. Because the soundness
of their models depends so heavily on the empirical evidence, however, I focus
mostly on their case studies. In particular, I offer an in-depth analysis of part
of one of their main case studies, which deals with a famous dispute between
' Much of what I discuss in relation to customary international law also applies to their
discussion of treaties. Nevertheless, because customary international law and treaties have
different characteristics, I confine my discussion to the former.
5 The bulk of the game theory applicable to customary international law appears in chapter
2; the case studies appear in chapter 3. The same pattern applies to their discussion of treaties,
with chapter 4 devoted to theory and chapters 5 and 6 to case studies.
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the United States and Great Britain over the customary international law of
neutrality during the U.S. Civil War. My review of the historical materials
suggests two main points. First, Goldsmith and Posner's historical account is
superficial and incomplete and fails to present a balanced picture of the events
they purport to describe. Second, a more thorough-though still
preliminary-rendering of the historical sources shows that the actual history
is much richer, more complex, and more challenging to their account than they
suppose. It is not that this history necessarily resists explanation in terms of
self-interest. My point, rather, is that their case studies fail to capture the
relevant history and that the actual historical materials suggest that stable
forms of cooperation, based on norms of customary international law, are more
possible than their pessimistic intuitions allow. In my view, the crucial
empirical side of their project fails to support their general hypotheses.
Because I have only looked in depth at one part of one of their case studies,
it is theoretically possible that their other historical claims are more persuasive.
For several reasons, however, that seems unlikely. First, the flaws in their
account of the Civil War are sufficiently serious to call into question whether
Goldsmith and Posner are even attempting to provide historically balanced
accounts. Second, I have chosen a case study which deals with war. If there
is any area of international law where self-interest, rather than law and
morality, play a predominant role in state action, it must be here. This case
study, then, is the one most likely to support the thrust of Goldsmith and
Posner's claims rather than the other way around. If close scrutiny of their
own case study-in an area most favorable to their approach-fails to support
their claims, it is fair to conclude that the empirical support they have mustered
for their overall approach is unconvincing. Finally, it is not just that their
specific rendering of the Civil War history is flawed. For reasons that I touch
on below, their general methodological approach-reflected not only in their
approach to the Civil War but in their approach to all of their case studies-is
not sufficiently rigorous to permit them to render sound historical judgments.
II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
At the center of Goldsmith and Posner's theoretical framework are four
relatively simple game theoretic models which, they claim, comprehensively
explain state behavior in relation to international law. They term these models
"coincidence of interest," "coercion," "cooperation," and "coordination."6 Of
6 For their exposition of these models, see GOLDSMrrH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 26-34.
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course, identifying these highly abstract "models" is only a modest first step.
Goldsmith and Posner need to do a great deal more work before their models
can be expected to generate specific predictions about the immensely complex
universe of state interaction. Indeed, the models are merely formal expressions
of some commonly held intuitive ideas. Put in less technical terms, the models
describe four types of situations in which a state can be expected to comply
with international law: when it is in its interests to comply irrespective of the
conduct of other states; when a more powerful state coerces it to comply; when
compliance is necessary in order to sustain ongoing mutually advantageous
cooperative relations with other states; and when compliance beneficially
coordinates its conduct with the activities of other states.
Goldsmith and Posner contend that employing this game theoretic
framework facilitates the study of international law by generating predictions
which can then be tested against empirical facts about the real world.
Although they do not spend a great deal of effort developing their models
beyond the mostly intuitive level I have described, they nevertheless believe
that their models generate some important predictions, in particular, that, in a
world of purely self-interested states, customary international law is apt to be
weak and ineffectual, incapable of reliably guiding the conduct of states. They
then devote the bulk of their effort to case studies which, they claim, confirm
these results.
I follow Goldsmith and Posner' s lead and devote the bulk of my attention
to their case studies. Nevertheless, to evaluate whether the case studies in fact
support their principal claims, it is useful to begin by focusing on their
theoretical discussion. I discuss, first, their claim that states are exclusively
self-interested and, second, their claim that customary international law is a
weak and unstable legal system.
A. Self-Interested States?
As already noted, Goldsmith and Posner repeatedly and emphatically claim
that states are exclusively motivated by self-interest or, as they put it in game
theory jargon, that "the payoffs from cooperation or deviation are the sole
determinants of whether states engage in the cooperative behaviors that are
labeled customary international law,"7 and, in a somewhat different
Id. at 39. Technically, states are exclusively motivated by self-interest only if their
"payoffs"-e.g., that which they seek rationally to maximize-are purely self-interested in
nature. Game theory, however, does not require that payoffs be defined in terms of self-interest.
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formulation, that customary international law "is not an exogenous influence
on state behavior.",8 Indeed, they distinguish their approach from other
international relations rational choice theories on the ground that their own
"methodological assumptions are more consistently instrumental than those
found in this literature."9
Given the centrality of this point to their argument, it comes as some
surprise that they never explain what they believe constitutes the self-interest
of states. The concept of self-interest, however, is hardly self-defining, and it
is therefore unclear what their claim actually entails. Indeed, without further
specification, their thesis would appear to lack sufficient content to explain
much, if anything, about state behavior.
Any rational choice modeling exercise has to start with an assumption
about the motivations of the agents under study. Simply to assert that they act
rationally to maximize their self-interest is, without more, essentially vacuous,
entailing no more than that agents act rationally to further whatever it is they
wish to further. That could be to acquire wealth or power, express anger or
love, obtain vengeance or glory, or uphold deeply held moral convictions, to
name but a few common human "preferences." To avoid tautology, therefore,
rational choice modeling ordinarily starts by identifying a parsimonious
interest or set of interests which the theory assumes motivates agents,
typically, for example, wealth or a desire for power over outcomes in some
relevant domain. The theorist then tries to verify the predictions which his
models yield by comparing them to the outcomes generated by empirical
testing.
Although Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge the importance of specifying
state interests, they concede their inability to do so on an ex ante basis.
According to Goldsmith and Posner, this inability results from the fact that
state interests vary from context to context and from legal regime to legal
regime. As a result, it is impossible to provide a general specification of what
states seek to maximize.' ° Indeed, the only general limit that Goldsmith and
Posner are willing to venture is purely negative: The one thing states are not
Hence, consistently with the premises of game theory, state payoffs could include preferences
for moral action and law compliance. Of course, that is not what Goldsmith and Posner have in
mind.
Id. See also id. at 25, 43.
9 Id. at 17.
'0 See id. at 6.
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motivated by in any context, they claim, is the desire or "preference" to uphold
international law or morality."
In view of this acknowledged inability to provide a general definition of
self-interest, one wonders in what sense Goldsmith and Posner believe they are
offering a "comprehensive theory" of customary international law. What states
seek to maximize is at the core of any rational choice account. By leaving it
to future scholars to investigate this question on a case by case basis,
Goldsmith and Posner appear to concede that their models can do little work
on their own.
Be that as it may, the failure to specify what states maximize undercuts the
force of their emphatic claim that states act only out of self-interest. It is true,
of course, that by eliminating one type of possible motivation-an interest in
law compliance-Goldsmith and Posner have narrowed the range of potential
state motivations. But they leave open a vast range of alternative possibilities.
For all that Goldsmith and Posner are willing to say, states may act, as realists
have traditionally claimed, only to advance their economic interests or relative
power positions, but they may also act out of a desire for vengeance or glory,
or out of habit, pride, honor, desire for consistency, or for any of a number of
reasons that are not, strictly speaking, preferences for law compliance or moral
action. Indeed, states may simply have a dispositional preference for
cooperative over conflictual relations. As a result, the claim that states act
solely out of self-interest, even understood in Goldsmith and Posner's
restricted sense, is nearly as vacuous as the claim that they act out of self-
interest in an unrestricted sense.
Goldsmith and Posner might reply that the range of possible motivations is
narrower than I have suggested, and, indeed, the tenor of their discussion
certainly suggests that this is their view. In their case studies, for example,
they consistently identify state interests in military, political, and economic
terms. If that is the case, however, it is puzzling that they have not simply
announced their agreement with the realist account and even more puzzling
" See id. at 9. In addition to asserting their belief that states are not in fact motivated by a
preference for compliance with law, Goldsmith and Posner explain this exclusion as necessary
to give their models explanatory power: The assumption that states have a preference to comply
"says nothing interesting about when and why states act consistently with international law and
provides no basis for understanding variation in, and violation of, international law." Id. at 10.
But this has to be wrong. The point is to construct a model that accurately predicts state
behavior. If states in fact have a preference for complying with law, then a model which
excludes that preference will provide unreliable predictions in at least some cases.
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that they specifically deny holding the realist view. 2 In any case, if they do,
in fact, accept something like the realist view, they ought to acknowledge and
defend that approach.' 3 Of course, that would subject their argument to a
whole new set of criticisms, including doubts about the plausibility of such a
reductionist account of state motivation. In the meantime, given their
professed inability to specify the nature of states' self-interest, it is impossible
to draw much content from their claim.'4
It may be, however, that Goldsmith and Posner are not really interested in
providing an affirmative explanation for state behavior, but, rather, their
interest is just in ruling out the possibility that states are ever motivated by a
sense that complying with the law is a value in itself. The belief that
international law has "compliance pull" seems, indeed, to be one of the main
targets of their book. If states never give any independent weight to the
existence of a legal obligation, then surely a state-the United States,
perhaps?-has no reason to feel that it should behave any differently. It can
12 See id. at 6.
13 For a classic statement of the realist, or neorealist, position, see KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLrIcs (1979).
14 The difficulties with their claim are exacerbated by their reliance on the at least partly
fictional notion of collective intent. Again, Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge this issue but
quickly pass over it. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 6-8. I will not pursue the well
known problems involved in ascribing intentions (or motivations) to collective bodies, except
to underscore the complex character of the modem bureaucratic state with its multilayered
institutional structures and competing power centers. Goldsmith and Posner strain credulity
when they suppose that state policy is determined-or at least sufficiently so--by a unique state
interest or set of interests that are consistently adhered to over time. See id. at 6, 8. Rather, on
many, if not most questions, states are internally divided. Indeed, the historical account I present
below nicely reveals how high executive officials frequently hold conflicting views about what
the national interest is, how it is best pursued, and even on what the law requires. Which view
prevails even on highly consequential decisions will depend, at least to some extent, on the
exigencies of jurisdictional authority, on personalities and interpersonal relationships, and on
momentary political considerations. Policy, moreover, will ultimately represent a more or less
stable compromise of many perspectives. This pattern is evident in the often conflicting views,
and recurrent clashes, between Secretary of State William Seward and Secretary of the Navy
Gideon Welles over U.S. policy towards international law in enforcing the naval blockade of the
South during the Civil War. For discussion, see infra notes 82-83, 85, 87 and accompanying
text. These complications only grow in magnitude, moreover, once we note that many decisions
about international law are made by lower level officials in a highly decentralized state
apparatus. The point is not that rational choice modeling premised on the state as a unitary actor
cannot produce useful insights, but that it is reckless to proceed on the assumption that these
difficulties do not substantially limit the capacity of such an approach to capture fully the
phenomena under study.
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in good conscience freely consult its interests, paying no heed to international
law as such. Or, to put it in the more colorful terms of contemporary
discourse, if the United States is from Mars and Europe from Venus, the U.S.
Martian has no reason to credit the moral outrage expressed by European
Venutians at its violations of international law. Both Martians and Venutians
are, after all, equally following their interests. It is just that international law
(apparently) is more favorable to European than to U.S. interests.15
I suspect that something like this thinking underlies Goldsmith and Posner' s
approach. There are several reasons, however, for viewing the broad empirical
claim which underlies it with skepticism. Begin with their inability to exclude
any other motivation from the wide range of possible state motivations.
Viewed in this light, their exclusion of a preference for law compliance seems
arbitrary, an arbitrariness which is exacerbated by their failure to offer any
theoretical justification for why this is the one motivation which they can say,
ex ante, states never have. In the absence of such a theoretical justification,
their claim appears to be no more than a brute assertion. Realists, in contrast,
root their empirical claims in a well-specified theory of international relations.
The structural logic of the international state of nature, they claim, forces states
to pursue their military and economic interests and to disregard moral and legal
concerns. Unlike Goldsmith and Posner, realists thus offer, in addition to
empirical studies confirming their predictions, theoretical grounds to support
their positive claims.
In the absence of theoretical support, Goldsmith and Posner have to rest the
entire burden of persuasion on their empirical case studies. But this is a weight
which their case studies simply cannot bear. I leave aside for now whether the
manner in which they have executed the case studies is sufficiently rigorous
to permit them to draw from them any empirical support for their hypotheses.
Under the best of circumstances, it is extremely difficult to prove that self-
interest (suitably specified) provides the sole explanation for state behavior in
a given instance. If a case study reveals a state's compliance with an accepted
rule, for example, it will be difficult to establish why the state complied. It
may have complied out of self-interest, or it may have complied out of a sense
of duty to uphold the law. Or, it may have complied for both reasons. Without
highly refined tools, the cause will appear to be uncertain or overdetermined,
failing to provide a sound basis for any empirical conclusion. Likewise, where
a case study reveals a state's violation of an accepted rule, one plausible
"5 See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER (2003).
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inference may be that the state acted in its self-interest, though most often
other explanations will also be plausible. Even where self-interest appears to
provide the best explanation, however, that will still not be sufficient to
establish that the state did not also have a preference for compliance with the
law. At most, it can only establish that self-interest trumped in this particular
instance. Of course, even if self-interest appears to be the sole motivation in
one or more instances, that fact alone will not prove that a preference for law
compliance does not exist in other cases. The methodological complexities are
extremely demanding. 6
My point is not to deny the plausibility of the claim, at least in some form,
that states generally follow their self-interest. Rather, what I want to
emphasize is how little Goldsmith and Posner have actually done to make that
claim any more plausible than it will already be to observers of state behavior.
It is mysterious, moreover, why they insist so stridently that states have
absolutely no preference in any context to comply with international law
because of its status as law. This claim is dubious when formulated in such
absolutist terms and, once it is conceded that self-interest plays a large role in
state motivation, adds little to their overall argument.
In any case, Goldsmith and Posner tie their claim about the self-interested
behavior of states to their larger attack on the so-called "compliance pull"
which many scholars believe international law exercises on the conduct of
states. For Goldsmith and Posner, the compliance pull just describes the
degree to which states are motivated to comply with international law because
it is law, rather than because it is in their self-interest. If states have no such
motivation, as they insist, then international law, by definition, can have no
compliance pull. However, this conception of the compliance pull is so overly
stringent that it leads Goldsmith and Posner astray. 17 In the context of rational
1 Additional complexities are introduced, moreover, by Goldsmith and Posner's reliance on
the idea of collective motivation. For example, how is the empiricist supposed to determine
whose interests represent those of the "state"? Likewise, what should he do in the face of shifts
in political power within the state? If Republicans believe that the use of "coercive"
interrogation techniques is in U.S. interests and Democrats believe otherwise, is the use of such
techniques in U.S. interests so long as a Republican sits in the White House and not in its
interests when a Democrat assumes the presidency? What if the Secretary of Defense believes
that the use of coercive interrogations is in U.S. interests but the Secretary of State disagrees?
Given the degree of internal conflict over many aspects of foreign policy, these considerations
raise daunting theoretical and empirical challenges. For further discussion, see supra note 14.
" There are many different versions of the compliance pull. As Goldsmith and Posner
suggest, some rest heavily on the idea of legitimacy, arguing that states generally view
international law or at least some international legal norms as legitimate and are inclined to
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choice theory, the important question is not whether states follow their self-
interest. Indeed, that is the first premise of a rational choice approach. Rather,
the critical question is whether states have standing dispositions to view
compliance in many or most instances as in their interests and as not requiring
continual reevaluation on an ongoing basis. 8 If so, then international law
exercises a compliance pull irrespective of whether states are exclusively self-
interested. What is crucial, then, is not whether self-interest is the only
motivating force but whether international law can provide states with a
reasonably stable equilibrium on which they can rely-thereby giving rise to
a "compliance pull"-or, as Goldsmith and Posner contend, it cannot. And
this brings us to their second, and more consequential, claim.
B. The Supposed Weakness of Customary International Law
Unfortunately, equally significant problems beset this claim as well.
Goldsmith and Posner believe not only that states follow their self-interest but
that, as a result, customary international law is apt to be weak and unstable.
In constructing their models, however, I fear that they have stacked the deck
in a negative direction. Their skepticism is, therefore, at least premature.
Goldsmith and Posner's second claim is really a mixture of specific points
and repeated expressions of pessimism about the prospects for cooperative
behavior guided by customary international law. The idea is that customary
international law-understood as behavioral regularities in which states
engage-may sometimes exist (as predicted by their models) but-and this is
comply with them for this reason. A variety of accounts have been offered to explain the sources
of this sense of legitimacy. Others challenge the idea that states' conceptions of their self-
interest are exogenously determined. In this view, international law exercises a substantial
influence over how states conceive of their interests, rendering the emphasis in rational choice
approaches on state preferences at least to some extent circular. States may follow their self-
interest, but international law influences how they perceive what is in their interest, giving rise
to a different notion of the nature of the compliance pull.
" There are a number of considerations-consistent with rational choice premises-which
may explain this standing disposition. Among these are a combination of limited resources,
bounded rationality, and the fact that states participate in a dense web of mutually beneficial
interactions which, they have reason to fear, will be undermined by noncompliant behavior even
in discrete instances. The existence of a stable balance of power may also lead states to view
noncompliance in general as risky to important state interests. Likewise, the complex
multilayered structure of the modern bureaucratic state may make adoption by high government
officials of a default compliance policy a potentially valuable mechanism for controlling the
conduct of lower level officials. For further discussion, see infra notes 22-27 and accompanying
text.
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the important point-is possible only in limited areas and is likely to be weak
and unstable. They do not elaborate much on their theoretical reasons for this
claim. They are most specific when they briefly sketch a general argument for
the view that multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, cooperation in solving
collective action problems is highly unlikely to emerge through the mechanism
of customary international law, or, in their more technical terms, multistate
prisoner's dilemmas will generally not result in cooperative equilibria.' 9
Beyond that, they repeatedly stress that cooperative action in accordance with
norms of customary international law, where it exists at all, is likely to be weak
and fragile, subject to shocks whenever exogenous changes occur in
technology, the environment, or relative power relations among states.20 "We
are more skeptical about the role of international law," Goldsmith and Posner
declare, "than most (but not all) international relations institutionalists [i.e.,
rational choice international relations theorists] and most rational choice-
minded lawyers. ''21
It is difficult to reply to this claim in part because it is too squishy to be
easily falsified. Even if one shows that cooperation occurred in one instance,
Goldsmith and Posner can always brush that example aside as falling within
the range of possible cooperation that their models predict (or might predict if
fully specified) and deny that it undermines their general pessimistic
assessment. How many counterexamples are necessary to undermine their
pessimism? The answer is elusive.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that, by failing to incorporate into
their models important features of the international system which have the
potential substantially to enhance the viability of customary international law,
19 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 36-37. George Norman and Joel Trachtman offer
a strong technical reply to Goldsmith and Posner on this point, in George Norman & Joel P.
Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'LL. 541 (2005). Goldsmith
and Posner do not address the role of reputation in encouraging compliance with customary
international law, but they do sketch a generally pessimistic account in relation to treaty
compliance. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 102-04. They are also skeptical that
customary international law can reflect universal, as opposed to mere bilateral, behavioral
regularities. See id. at 25. It seems right to claim that bilateral regularities are easier to form or
sustain, but it is difficult to understand what basis Goldsmith and Posner have for doubting the
possibility of wider regional or global regularities as well. Whether these can be sustained
depends entirely upon the structure of state "payoffs" which Goldsmith and Posner have not
attempted to specify. Hence, any conclusion about how widespread they are likely to be seems
premature.
20 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 17, 31, 39-43.
21 Id. at 17.
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Goldsmith and Posner have effectively cooked the books. Consider, most
importantly, how they construct their "games." They focus exclusively on
stock single-issue games like the capture of enemy fishing vessels during war.
However, the games which states actually play are vastly more complex.22
States repeatedly and intensively interact across a wide range of subject areas,
and they do so indefinitely into the future. They are, in fact, engaged in a
"super game." This means that there are many opportunities for states to
impose punishments on, and offer rewards to, other states depending upon the
choices they make in the ongoing set of interactions. At one point, Goldsmith
and Posner acknowledge this complexity, noting: "Analyses of customs
between states should not overlook the influence of future interaction between
the states outside the narrow context of the game. 23 But they never consider
the potential implications of this feature of state interaction, preferring instead
to focus on simple single-issue games. Moreover, as this quotation reflects,
they fail to consider the possibility that reputation may sometimes play a wider
role, affecting not only future bilateral relations between the cooperating and
defecting states but future interactions between the defecting state and third
24parties.
The failure to incorporate these considerations into their theoretical
framework means that their models are unlikely to capture the full range of
cooperative possibilities that may be sustainable even by states acting solely
out of self-interest. This is, of course, a crucial point, suggesting that, even
under a rational choice game theoretic analysis, relatively nonconflictual,
mutually beneficial cooperation, guided by customary international law, may
be possible on a wide basis. If so, game theory would recognize that
customary international law can have an important impact upon state behavior,
establishing the equilibrium which permits states to cooperate and the baseline
which states can use to determine whether other states are cooperating or
defecting. Once such an equilibrium is reached, states will use customary
international law as a guide for determining what conduct they should or
should not engage in. 25 This does not mean that they will comply with
22 For their repeated recourse to the single-issue enemy fishing vessel game, see id. at 26-32,
35, 40-42.
23 Id. at 32.
24 For Goldsmith and Posner's pessimistic discussion of reputation in the treaty compliance
context, which presumably they would apply to customary international law as well, see id. at
102-04.
' For these reasons, it is odd-and arguably misleading-that Goldsmith and Posner insist
so strenuously on the claim that customary international law is not an "exogenous influence on
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customary international law no matter what, but it does mean that states have
strong motives for taking care to follow customary international law so long
as they wish to remain in the cooperative game or perhaps in a larger set of
linked cooperative games. Depending on how widespread and robust such
cooperative games are, therefore, customary international law may have a large
role to play in shaping state behavior. This is all the more likely to be so, if
contra Goldsmith and Posner, customary international law does have a
"compliance pull" because of states' preference to follow international law.
There is another related respect in which Goldsmith and Posner's
theoretical discussion underestimates the potential importance of customary
international law. Although they develop a model based on "coercion," they
seem to envision only the simple case of a predatory powerful state forcing a
weak state to comply with its peremptory demands.26 This is undoubtedly one
version of coercive action, and if it were the only way in which coercion were
exercised in the international sphere, it would certainly provide grounds for
pessimism, at least on normative grounds. It might also provide reasons to
doubt the stability of a system based upon the use of bilateral force.
The model of bilateral force, however, does not exhaust the possibilities for
the use of coercion to uphold international law. From the early classic writers
to contemporary times, international lawyers have recognized the crucial role
states' behavior." Id. at 39. Clearly, in cases where states reach a cooperative equilibrium based
on customary international law-which Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge can at least
sometimes happen-customary international has an impact on their behavior.
Goldsmith and Posner, however, insist on a far stricter, and counterintuitive, interpretation
of what constitutes an "exogenous influence." To understand their approach, assume that the
existence of a norm of customary international law signals the existence of an actual underlying
cooperative equilibrium and that the absence of such a norm signals that states have either failed
to recognize, or there is in fact no potential, cooperative equilibrium. According to Goldsmith
and Posner, the existence of such a norm has no "exogenous influence" on a cooperating state's
behavior. Why? It is true that the norm affects the state's behavior in the sense that but for the
norm the state would, or at least might, behave differently. Given the norm, the state engages
in the behavior which promotes its long-term interests. In the absence of the norm, the state
would choose to engage in different conduct, promoting its short-term interest. Although that
would appear to constitute, in ordinary terms, an "exogenous influence," it does not qualify in
Goldsmith and Posner's sense. Rather, the norm would only have an exogenous influence, for
Goldsmith and Posner, if the state would forego its short term interest, even if it no longer had
any long-term interest in remaining in the cooperative game. In other words, their interpretation
of exogenous influence is simply another--albeit a more obtuse-way of saying that states do
not follow international law out of a preference to comply with the law, but only out of self-
interest.
' See id. at 28-29.
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played by the balance of power in stabilizing the international legal system."
Goldsmith and Posner never discuss the balance of power, presumably because
they view it as dependent upon multilateral cooperation, which, they believe,
is unlikely to occur. But this skepticism flies in the face of much of world
history. In fact, as is well known, competing alliances have been common
features of international relations. Perhaps, this circumstance can be explained
in terms of the linked games in which states are engaged. Be that as it may, in
the past the resulting balance of power systems have enhanced the stability of
the international legal system, and they continue to have the potential to do so
today. The important questions-in relation to which game theory might be
usefully deployed-are, therefore, whether, and the conditions under which,
different distributions of power can support a stable system of international
law across different domains of state interaction, and how robust such a system
might be in the face of changes in the distribution of power over time. Also
particularly relevant today: What are the implications for international law of
the emergence of a global hegemon? By failing even to consider this larger
more complex picture, Goldsmith and Posner have simply ignored important
phenomena which need to be incorporated into their models if they are to
provide reliable predictions of state behavior.
It is not my aim to offer rigorous arguments about how to construct game
theory models like those Goldsmith and Posner offer. I leave that to those who
are competent to the task. My point is only that there are reasons to believe
that Goldsmith and Posner have failed to incorporate into their models
essential features of the international landscape without which their models are
apt to underestimate the potential stability of the international legal system.
ll. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY: GOLDSMITH AND POSNER'S APPROACH TO
HISTORY
As we have already seen, game theory models, however mathematically
sound, are unhelpful if they fail to predict actual state behavior. Consequently,
Goldsmith and Posner's four case studies are of critical importance to their
claims. They are supposed to provide empirical confirmation of the
27 For a useful discussion, see PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN
WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 7-19 (1993). For
insightful discussion of the role of the balance of power in the thinking of Lassa Oppenheim, the
leading international law scholar of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see
Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of
Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International Law, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 401 (2002).
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predictions which their theoretical models purportedly generate and thereby to
corroborate their two main claims-that states pursue only their self-interest
in the processes through which norms of customary international law are
formed, change, evolve, and are interpreted and in deciding whether to comply
with or violate existing law, and that there are, in fact, far fewer behavioral
regularities than has generally been thought and that those which exist tend to
be fragile, short-lived, and prone to dissipate in response to exogenous changes
in background conditions.28
This is a tall order for a limited group of case studies, and, for a number of
compelling reasons, the studies fail to provide the desired confirmation. As an
initial matter, there are serious selection bias issues in Goldsmith and Posner's
sample that taint any results that actually emerge from the studies. How do we
know that these four case studies are representative of state behavior in other
areas? How were they chosen? Why the focus on historical practices rather
than more contemporary examples of customary international law norms?
Even more problematic, is Goldsmith and Posner's historical methodology,
and here I am not (yet) referring to whether they have presented a fair account
of the relevant historical events. Rather, the problem is that Goldsmith and
Posner make little effort to investigate direct historical evidence-of which
there is a great deal-of the actual motivations of the individuals who made
the decisions on which they focus and of the background circumstances which
informed their actions. Instead, they focus on the events themselves and draw
speculative inferences about why states acted as they did.29 It is hardly
surprising that their speculations confirm their starting hypothesis that self-
interest provides the best explanation for state behavior in every instance. But
this approach is unsound from a methodological perspective, and it seems
28 For the case studies, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 45-78. The studies deal
with the law of neutrality, ambassadorial immunity, the territorial sea, and the fishing vessel
exemption in the law of war recognized in the famous case, Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900).
29 See, e.g., GOLDsMrrH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 49-50 (discussing the Boer War but
failing to consider the internal deliberations that explain Britain's policy decisions and reveal
the unusual political context in which those decisions were made and the degree to which the
British government generally considered compliance with international law an urgent priority).
Goldsmith and Posner also tend to downplay or elide altogether important doctrinal complexities
which are part of the explanation for state behavior. See id. (describing the Boer War
controversy but making it virtually impossible to tell what legal issue was in dispute-the
definition of contraband, the continuous voyage doctrine, or the free ships, free goods rule-or
the legal basis for the resolution of the dispute). For discussion of these various legal doctrines,
see infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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particularly questionable to be insisting on rigorous application of
mathematically inspired models on the theory side but to feel free to ignore
basic methodological constraints on the empirical side.
These problems are compounded by the breadth of their claims. Goldsmith
and Posner broadly assert that states exclusively follow their self-interest not
only when deciding whether to comply with customary international law but
also when attempting to establish, modify, and interpret those norms. But it
is widely accepted that self-interest plays a large role in state behavior, and,
though Goldsmith and Posner' s claims are undoubtedly dubious in the extreme
form in which they assert them, few would deny that states frequently pursue
their interests when seeking to establish, modify, and interpret principles of
customary international law. The same is obviously true of individuals within
domestic society when it comes to the establishment, amendment, and
interpretation of domestic law. (Would it be difficult to pick four pieces of
congressional legislation and speculate convincingly about how the self-
interest of powerful actors substantially shaped the contours of their
provisions? Are we surprised to find that the litigating (or negotiating)
positions of parties likewise tend to reflect their self-interest?) As a result,
much of Goldsmith and Posner's discussion seeks to establish what is
(relatively) less controversial or, in any case, what is not central to
contemporary debates over customary international law."0 Things get more
interesting when they claim that existing customary international law has no
compliance pull whatsoever, that states comply or not based solely on their
self-interest, and, further, that the possibilities for the emergence of stable
cooperative equilibria guided by customary international law are minimal.
Unfortunately, however, Goldsmith and Posner do not attempt to sort out when
the state behaviors they are discussing are of the former and when they are of
the latter variety, and much of the rhetorical punch of their discussion comes
30 Indeed, Goldsmith and Posner seem to think that it is evidence of a defect or weakness that
customary international law norms in some cases promote the interests of all states or benefit
some while harming none. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 62 (describing the
"innocent passage" rule in maritime law as having this character and quoting-though providing
an incorrect citation to-William Hall, a leading British international law authority in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the effect that denying innocent passage "is of
advantage to no one"). But, from virtually any normative perspective, the law ought to do
precisely that, especially in cases where states may, thoughtlessly or out of an overabundance
of caution, be tempted to do gratuitous harm. See also id. at 76 (quoting, though again providing
an incorrect citation to, Hall in another context making a similar point about the Paquete
Habana exemption for fishing vessels). Of course, if that were all the law could accomplish, it
could only have a modest impact on state behavior.
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from examples of the former, which seem to lend plausibility to the examples
of the latter.
These difficulties, however, pale in comparison to the problems which
emerge on careful examination of the accuracy and balance with which they
present their historical case studies. I will only examine one of these-which
traces some of the relevant history pertaining to the customary law of
neutrality in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-and my focus will
be on one part of their discussion, that which deals with the U.S. Civil War.
I focus on the Civil War example for several reasons. First, it deals with a
topic which seems, at first blush, strongly to support Goldsmith and Posner's
claims. It is well known that when the United States unexpectedly became a
belligerent in a conflict with an important naval dimension, it suddenly
reversed its traditional positions on some of the pertinent customary
international law norms, positions which it had strenuously advocated over the
course of its entire prior history. If the Civil War provides a more equivocal
picture of the empirical evidence than Goldsmith and Posner suggest in their
discussion-and if their objectivity in describing the relevant history is in
doubt-there are strong grounds for doubting their other case study results.
Second, as I alluded to at the outset, this case study deals with an aspect of the
laws of war and, hence, is an area where power and interest, rather than law
and morality, are most apt to play dominant roles in state behavior and where
international law is most likely to be disregarded. If the empirical evidence in
this area does not support their claims, it suggests that their larger project is in
trouble. Finally, in order to make sound historical claims, it is necessary to
undertake a thorough research effort. Even for a relatively limited time frame
such as 1861-65, and a relatively discrete historical incident like the Civil War
neutrality disputes, substantial efforts are necessary to justify the making of
even tentative judgments. Indeed, I do not claim to have mastered the relevant
historical materials, but I do feel confident that Goldsmith and Posner have
only begun to scratch the surface of what is in fact an immensely rich and
promising set of materials with which to work.
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CIVIL WAR
A full account of the disputes over the law of neutrality during the Civil
War would require a lengthy article. I can sketch only some of the major
points here. In my view, Goldsmith and Posner's account fails to present a
balanced or accurate picture of the nature of the various disputes that arose and
the resolutions which they engendered. Although my conclusions are only
[Vol. 34:333
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preliminary,3 my research strongly suggests that, contrary to Goldsmith and
Posner's claims, customary international law played a surprisingly robust role
in the disputes which arose between the United States and Great Britain over
neutral and belligerent rights under the law of nations. It may be that the
disputed "compliance pull"32 contributed to this outcome-a conclusion for
which there is certainly evidence-or, alternatively, it may be that, despite
strictly self-interested motivations on both sides, a stable equilibrium was
nevertheless in place, a result which would shed considerable doubt on
Goldsmith and Posner's pessimism about customary international law's
possibilities. Be that as it may, even assuming that a purely interest-based
story can account for all of the relevant events, it would certainly be a very
different story than the one which Goldsmith and Posner outline in their book.
It would point, moreover, in a very different direction. Rather than
downgrading the importance of customary international law, which seems to
be a central aim of Goldsmith and Posner' s book, it would confirm its potential
as a tool for stabilizing state interactions and for enhancing the capacity of
states to advance their long term interests.
To understand Goldsmith and Posner' s claims about the law of neutrality,
it is necessary first to suffer through some background remarks on the
applicable doctrine. The law of neutrality, which historically was an important
part of the laws of war, was the subject of extended controversy and dispute
throughout the nineteenth and early tweentieth centuries (and indeed before
then).33 In particular, Great Britain, being the dominant naval power and
3" I have, in fact, only scratched the surface of the relevant historical materials, working
principally from secondary sources and some published primary source material. There is a vast
amount of additional material-much of it archival-that would need to be digested before any
rigorously developed historical claims could be ventured.
32 Following Goldsmith and Posner, I use the phrase "compliance pull" here to refer to
states' preference to comply with international law for its own sake or out of sense of moral duty.
Nevertheless, contra Goldsmith and Posner, and as discussed above, "compliance pull" also
usefully describes self-interested behavior that leads states to adopt a policy of presumptive
compliance with international law, subject to being overridden in some circumstances. See
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
" There are a large number of books on neutrality law during the relevant period. For a
sampling, see, e.g., 11 J.H.W. VERZUL, W.P. HEERE, &J.P.S. OFFERHAUS, INTERNATIONALLAW
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE LAW OFMARrnME PRIZE (1992); JOHN W. COOGAN, THE END
OF NEUTRALITY: THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND MARITIME RIGHTS, 1899-1915 (1981);
PHILIP C. JESSUP, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE (1928); C. JOHN
COLOMBOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE (1926); 7 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONALLAw §§ 1166-1336 (1906). Prize law is also treated at length in virtually every
major pre-World War II treatise on international law. See, e.g., 2L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
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frequently engaged in war, took a generally narrow view of neutral rights and
a broad view of belligerent rights. States which were most often neutral and
which had weaker navies-the United States qualifying on both
fronts-resisted some aspects of the British approach.34 There are certainly
difficult methodological questions about the extent to which there was
customary international law on persistently disputed points. The difficulties
are compounded by the move from a more natural law based theory of the law
of nations in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to a more positivist
conception as the nineteenth century progressed. In any case, there were also
many points of more or less widespread agreement, and, in the absence of
consensus, British practice tended to prevail since it was, after all, the
dominant sea power and its prize courts developed an elaborate body of law
in the very large number of prize cases they were called upon to decide.
Strikingly, the decisions of the great English admiralty judge Sir William Scott
(later Lord Stowell), during the period 1798 to 1828, a period which
encompassed the Napoleonic Wars, were remarkably influential and remained
so even into the early twentieth century.3" Indeed, U.S. judges--Chief Justice
Marshall and Justice Story among them-routinely relied upon Scott's
decisions in resolving prize cases, even during the War of 1812 when the
United States was fighting a war with England in which the very causis belli
was British neutrality practice upheld by Scott as consistent with the law of
nations.36
LAW: A TREATISE: WAR AND NEUTRALITY §§ 173-214, 285-438 (1906).
' The controversies between the United States and Great Britain from 1776 to the end of
World War I are well canvassed in CARLTON SAVAGE, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD
MARrTME COMMERCE IN WAR (1934) (in two volumes) (summarizing history and reprinting
extensive diplomatic materials and original source documents). For the leading nineteenth
century U.S. treatise on international law, which considers the relevant issues in depth, see
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Henry Dane Jr. ed., 1866).
" It would be difficult to overstate the influence of Scott'sjudgments, which were constantly
cited and discussed at length in diplomatic exchanges, court judgments, and learned treatises.
For discussion of Scott and his influence, see HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, SIR WILLIAM SCOTT,
LORD STOWEIL, JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY, 1798-1828 (1987).
36 See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 35, at 280-85 (describing Scott's influence as reflected in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions and in the works of leading U.S. commentators like James Kent
and Henry Wheaton). The references in Supreme Court prize cases to Scott's decisions are
pervasive. For examples from the War of 1812, see, e.g., The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 181
(1814); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 253 (1814); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch.) 191 (1815). On Story's relationship with Scott, see BOURGUIGNON, supra note
35, at 282-83.
[Vol. 34:333
2006] LEAVING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW WHERE IT IS 353
The law of neutrality at that time was quite a complex affair. Goldsmith
and Posner emphasize the so called "free ships, free goods" doctrine, which I
come to in a moment. That emphasis, however, is misleading unless the
doctrine is situated in the larger frame of neutrality law of which it was a part.
A principal focus of neutrality law was trade by merchant ships of neutral
powers with belligerents. When war broke out between two belligerents,
neutrals preferred to remain as unaffected by the conflict as possible (or, more
cynically, wished to engage in highly lucrative war profiteering). Hence, they
favored rules which would protect their merchants in continuing to trade with
the belligerent parties. Belligerents, in contrast, wished to cut off trade with
their enemy. Most importantly, they wished to prevent "contraband" (weapons
or other items useful to the enemy's military) from reaching their enemy via
neutral ships. In some cases, moreover, they wished to disrupt the economy
of the enemy state and thereby weaken its capacity or will to fight. In order to
accomplish this, they needed to prevent neutrals from trading with their
enemy.37
The law of neutrality was an attempt to find some reconciliation of these
conflicting interests through compromise. The widely accepted rule was that
neutral merchants were permitted to trade with belligerents subject to at least
three important limitations. The first was that they could not sell contraband
to belligerents and, if they attempted to do so, they were subject to seizure and
confiscation as lawful prize.3 8 Second, belligerents were permitted to impose
blockades on belligerent ports. When an "effective" blockade was in
force-when, that is, the blockading navy posted warships outside of the
blockaded port to prevent neutral access and made it dangerous for neutrals to
attempt to run the blockade-neutrals were not permitted to trade at that port.
If they attempted to do so, they were again subject to confiscation.39 Finally,
there was a great deal of dispute over whether neutrals could carry "enemy"
property. The British took the view that enemy property in a neutral ship was
still enemy property subject to confiscation and that the neutral "bottom" did
not "cover" the enemy goods. The opposing view, long advocated by the
United States and others, was that neutrals could carry enemy goods, that "free
" My sketch of the relevant interests is highly oversimplified. In fact, for example, the
interests of some belligerents were favorable to a strong neutral rights regime, because neutral
trade was essential to their economy. It was the dominant naval power in a conflict that had the
strongest interest in opposing neutral rights.
3 For mid-nineteenth century views on contraband, see, e.g., WHEATON, supra note 34, §§
476-507, at 607-63.
3' For mid-nineteenth century views on blockade, see, e.g., id. §§ 509-523, at 668-87.
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ships" make "free goods." As a practical matter, the British view
prevailed-and, indeed, was accepted by the U.S. courts-until sometime after
the 1856 Declaration of Paris in which, for the first time, most of the main
maritime powers (but not including the United States) agreed to the free ships,
free goods rule.'
There were, of course, many, many subsidiary rules. These included, for
example, rules on when and where belligerents could board and search neutral
vessels to determine whether they were carrying contraband or enemy property
or were intending to run a lawful blockade; rules concerning convoys; rules of
attribution for determining whether property was enemy or neutral; rules
dealing with the treatment of neutral crews whose ships were seized and taken
in for adjudication by the captor's prize courts; specialized rules of evidence
for prize court proceedings; and rules for determining whether a neutral's ship
and cargo were both subject to confiscation or just its cargo and for damages
in the event of an illegal seizure.
One particularly important subsidiary rule for present purposes, was the so-
called "continuous voyage" doctrine. This was a controversial doctrine
originally developed by the British prize courts. In simplified form, the idea
was that neutral ships sailing between neutral ports (and thereby normally
immune from capture by belligerents) could be searched and seized if they
were carrying contraband items bound ultimately for a belligerent port or,
alternatively, if they were intending ultimately to run a lawful blockade. The
United States, along with other nations, strongly objected to this doctrine when
applied in various forms by the British during the Napoleonic Wars. (The
main application of the doctrine by the British admiralty courts at that time
was in the context of the colonial trade, an issue too involved to pursue here.)41
It remained controversial at the time the Civil War broke out. I caution that I
have just outlined some of the more salient rules and that there was ambiguity
about the scope of these rules in various respects too complex for discussion
here.
With this background in mind, we can now consider Goldsmith and
Posner's account of the U.S. Civil War practice, which is mostly (though not
o See, e.g., id. §§ 442-472 n.223, at 612-13.
41 The much disputed history of the continuous voyage doctrine has been the subject of many
books and articles. The best that I have read is HERBERT WHITTAKER BRIGGS, THE DOCrRINE
OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE (1926), which is a comprehensive treatment of the doctrine from its
origins in early British prize decisions through World War I. Much of what drove the debate was
continuing controversy over whether and, if so, how far the United States courts extended the
doctrine beyond the original British precedents from the period of the Napoleonic Wars.
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entirely) accurate so far as it goes, but is seriously incomplete.42 Among other
things, it leaves out many important facts which place the Civil War practice
in a light quite different from that which they portray and which powerfully
challenge their fundamental claims about customary international law. Their
story is relatively straightforward: Despite having been a vigorous champion
of neutral rights for the first seventy-five years of its history, the United States
abruptly changed its views as soon as it became a belligerent and its interests
changed.43 They focus on the free ships, free goods rule, which, they claim,
became customary international law after the 1856 Declaration of Paris," and
42 There have been a number of historical treatments of the Civil War neutrality conflicts.
The most comprehensive are STUART L. BERNATH, SQUALL ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR PRIZE CASES AND DIPLOMACY (1970); SISTER MAY MARTINICE O'ROURKE, THE
DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD DURING THE CIVIL WAR: His PoLIcES AS RELATED TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963) (Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley); James P.
Baxter, III, Some British Opinions as to Neutral Rights, 1861 to 1865, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 517
(1929) [hereinafter Baxter, British Opinions]; and James P. Baxter III, The British Government
and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865, 34 AM. HIST. REV. 9 (1928) [hereinafter Baxter, British
Government]. Another source is Frank L. Owsley, America and the Freedom of the Seas, 1861-
1865, printed in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. DODD BY HIS FORMER STUDENTS AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (Avery Craven ed., 1935). However, Owsley, upon whom Goldsmith
and Posner rely, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 47, was an old school southern
historian and passionate apologist for the old South who dedicated his career to undermining
"the entire Northern myth from 1820 to 1876," The Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and
Culture, Frank Lawrence Owsley 1890-1956, available at http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/
imagegallery.php?EntryID--0024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2006), and his account is, unfortunately,
compromised by his evident desire to embarrass the North. All of these accounts were written
by historians and suffer to varying degrees from a lack of legal sophistication. Baxter is the most
acute from a legal perspective but focuses mostly on the British side. Although sometimes
imprecise on legal details, Bernath offers the most recent account. O'Rourke focuses more
directly than Bernath on the legal problems. Also helpful-and legally beyond reproach-is
MOORE, supra note 33, §§ 1180,1195,1255-1262, 1265-1266, 1268-1271,1273-1279 (1906).
The Civil War precedents, both diplomatic and judicial, are discussed endlessly in the
voluminous legal literature on maritime and prize law. Much of the primary source
materials-which are voluminous-are archival.
" For their discussion of the Civil War, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 45-48,
52-53.
" For reasons they never explain, throughout their discussion of the neutral rights case study,
Goldsmith and Posner view the Declaration of Paris as embodying a pro-neutral rights teleology
which any other related doctrine limiting the scope of neutral trade somehow illegitimately or
hypocritically constricted. In particular, they treat the free ships, free goods rule as a baseline
and the various doctrines limiting the scope of neutral rights as derogations from it that reveal
something important for their purposes. They never explain exactly what that might be, but it
leads them to declare forcefully that the invocation of these doctrines by belligerents
demonstrates "that there was no behavioral regularity of not seizing enemy property on neutral
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they begin by asserting boldly that the United States "failed [the] test" by not
even respecting the free ships, free goods rule itself.45 They then proceed to
stress that the United States subscribed to a liberal blockade rule that it had
always opposed in the past and likewise embraced and even broadened, the
continuous voyage doctrine, which it had also previously opposed. The
consequence of this change of course, they note, was to undermine the free
ships, free goods rule, demonstrating that the United States paid no attention
to customary international law and simply pursued its interests so far as it
could without provoking the British to war.46 It is a tale of self-interested
behavior, constrained only by the threat of coercion, and demonstrates the
weakness of customary international law in the face of changes in state
"payoffs" and the hypocrisy of international law "cheap talk. '47
What, then, is missing from this account? Start with their opening salvo.
Goldsmith and Posner begin by boldly asserting that the United States, facing
"the first real test of its commitment to neutrality principles," unequivocally
"failed that test., 48 What is their first piece of evidence? "In the 'single
incident in which the question of free ships, free goods arose during the Civil
ships during the period in question." GOLDsMrH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 53. Even were that
correct, however, its significance would be unclear. The question is not whether there was an
unqualified behavioral regularity of not seizing enemy property on neutral ships, but whether
there was a behavioral regularity which conformed to existing customary international law in all
its complexity.
It seems that what underlies Goldsmith and Posner's thinking is an unacknowledged, and
presumably unintended, normative preference for neutral rights, the full realization of which was
undermined by doctrines like contraband, blockade, and continuous voyage. This same implicit
normative preference appears in the passage (written at the end of World War I) which they
quote to summarize their views on this very point:
While granting that the letter of the law [of free ships, free goods] has been
observed strictly, the conclusion that is forced upon the student of recent
practice is that, through unwarranted extension of belligerent rights based
upon related portions of the law of maritime warfare, the rule that private
enemy property is free when transported in neutral ships very nearly
approaches nullity.
Id. at 53 (quoting Harold Scott Quigley, The Immunity of Private Property from Capture at Sea,
11 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 26 (1917)) (emphasis added). For further discussion of the strong
normative project among scholars of this period in favor of neutral rights, of which Quigley's
article is a late and notably complex example, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
45 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 46.
4See id. at 46-48.
47 On cheap talk, see id. at 167-84.
48 Id. at 46.
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War,' " they note, "a U.S. prize court apparently rejected the principle. 49
Unfortunately for Goldsmith and Posner, however, the evidence is precisely
to the contrary. Not only did the United States not disregard the free ships,
free goods rule in the instance they cite; it embraced and complied with the
rule in general. Goldsmith and Posner's implication that the United States
refused to recognize the free ships, free goods rule, and thereby "failed" their
"test," is simply false.
Begin with the relatively minor incident to which they refer. As Goldsmith
and Posner recognize, at the outset of the war, the United States declared that,
even though it was not a party to the Declaration of Paris, it would observe the
free ships, free goods rule.5° The incident in question, involving the seizure of
a British merchant ship, the Clyde, was an anomaly, the only case of its kind
during the war.5 Apparently, a U.S. naval vessel seized the Clyde and brought
it in for adjudication at Key West. According to a diplomatic note from the
British Minister, the local prize court had released the ship but-in violation
of the free ships, free goods rule-had detained the cargo on the ground that
it was enemy property.52 In reply, Secretary of State Seward reaffirmed U.S.
adherence to the free ships, free goods principle; indicated that further
instructions would be issued to naval officers to clarify the point; and agreed
to have a copy of the British Ambassador's note forwarded to the prosecuting
officers of the prize courts in order "to guard against the possibility of
misapprehension on the subject. ' 53 At the same time, however, he expressed
skepticism about whether the prize court had actually detained the cargo solely
on the ground that it was enemy property.54
That is the sum and substance of what is known about the matter, hardly
solid evidence of U.S. unwillingness to recognize the free ships, free goods
' Id., quoting BERNATH, supra note 42, at 7.
50 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 46; WHEATON, supra note 34, § 475 n.223,
at 612-13 (8th ed. 1866) (edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Jr.). On the unsuccessful
negotiations during the Civil War looking towards United States accession to the Declaration,
which foundered over the impact of U.S. ratification on the Confederacy's obligations, see id.
at 608; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 63-66.
51 I am aware of only two secondary accounts of the incident. See BERNATH, supra note 42,
at 7; O'RoURKE, supra note 42, at 134-35.
52 O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 135 (quoting from Secretary of State William Seward's
diplomatic note of August 13, 1863). See also BERNATH, supra note 42, at 7. For a suggestive
explanation for why the prize court may have done so, see infra notes 58-61, 64 and
accompanying text.
53 See O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 135.
54 See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 7; O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 134-35.
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rule. Indeed, although the historical record ends with this brief exchange of
diplomatic notes, it seems likely, in fact, that the U.S. government successfully
allayed British concerns over the incident. There is apparently no record of the
ultimate disposition of the prize court proceedings and, more significantly, no
record of any appeal having been taken from an adverse judgment in the local
prize court.5" That alone would seem to undermine any claim that the United
States violated neutral rights, since the law of nations clearly required the
exhaustion of local remedies. In any case, however, it is reasonable to infer
from the apparent lack of an appeal that the matter was, in fact, resolved in a
manner acceptable to the British government. This conclusion is further
supported, moreover, by the fact that the brief diplomatic correspondence
concludes before any final resolution of the case was reached.56 Presumably,
the British would have continued to complain, as they did in numerous other
cases, if the prize court had persisted in denying the applicability of the free
ships, free goods rule.57 That the British government apparently let the matter
drop suggests that an acceptable outcome had been reached or that the matter
was so trivial as not to warrant further pursuit.
In light of these facts-which nowhere appear in Goldsmith and Posner's
discussion of the matter-it seems irresponsible for them to assert that United
States failed any "test" in the case of the Clyde. Indeed, the incomplete
historical record, such as it is, suggests precisely the contrary. However, there
is a larger problem lurking here. Goldsmith and Posner presumably single out
the Clyde incident from among the scores of neutrality disputes which arose
during the Civil War to suggest that it somehow revealed a general
unwillingness on the part of the United States to comply with the free ships,
free goods rule and, hence, with a principle unambiguously accepted as a rule
of customary international law. But this suggestion-obviously, of far greater
significance to their general thesis-is also mistaken. It is based, first, upon
an unjustified claim about the legal status of the free ships, free goods rule at
the commencement of the war and, second, upon an incomplete assessment of
the actual U.S. practice.
5' See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 7.
5 Id.; O'ROuRKE, supra note 42, at 135.
" The only other diplomatic note in the historical record is a follow-up sent by the British
Foreign Minister, Lord Russell, the following month, inquiring about the status of the matter.
See O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 135. The British aggressively pursued neutrality matters with
Seward throughout the war. See, e.g., id. at 125-33, 141-45; BERNATH, supra note 42, at 37-40,
48-56, 71-75, 113, 160.
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Begin with the status of the rule circa 1861. Despite the longstanding
position of the political branches on the issue, the U.S. courts, as well .as the
leading U.S. commentators on international law, had long accepted the
contrary British view as the correct understanding of existing customary
international law.5" Five years after the Declaration of Paris, and at the time
the Civil War commenced, the then leading U.S. authorities still doubted
whether the rule had attained the status of customary international law or was
binding only on parties to the Declaration of Paris.59 Indeed, Richard Henry
Dana, in his famous 1866 edition of Wheaton's great treatise, specifically
asserted that the U.S. courts, in the absence of a statute or treaty to the
contrary, remained bound to apply the traditional rule.' Thus, contrary to
Goldsmith and Posner's confident assertion, at the outset of the Civil War, the
United States might plausibly have denied that it was, in fact, bound by the
free ships, free goods principle. This position was all the stronger, moreover,
because of the early collapse of negotiations, conducted at the outset of the
war, between the United States, Great Britain, and France over U.S. accession
to the Declaration.61
Despite these legal niceties-and as the Clyde incident illustrates-the
United States announced shortly after the war began that it would comply with
the free ships, free goods rule, and, notwithstanding Goldsmith and Posner's
suggestion to the contrary, there is no evidence that it failed to meet this
commitment. Goldsmith and Posner recognize that the Clyde was "the single
incident" during the war in which any diplomatic issue arose over the free
ships, free goods principle, but they fail to notice the apparent significance of
this fact, viz., that there were no other incidents because the U.S. government
otherwise observed the rule. It is true that much Southern property-mostly
58 See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 418-22 (1815); WHEATON, supra note 34, § 471, at
603, § 475 n.223, at 606-07 (discussing, among others, the views of Kent and Wheaton).
" See WHEATON, supra note 34, § 475 n.223, at 606-13. These authorities included Richard
Henry Dana, who edited, and substantially contributed to, the 1866 edition of Wheaton's classic
treatise, as well as Henry Halleck and Theodore Woolsey, who wrote treatises on international
law published immediately before and during the war. See id. (with citations). For U.S.
diplomatic efforts in the wake of the Declaration of Paris to convince other powers to recognize
the free ships rule as a principle of customary international law applicable to all states not only
signatories to the Declaration, see 1 SAVAGE, supra note 34, at 77-86, 381-83, 392-93,396-99,
402-09.
60 WHEATON, supra note 34, § 475 n.223, at 613.
6' For discussion, see supra note 50 and accompanying text. Of course, in view of the
traditional U.S. diplomatic position--and U.S. diplomatic activities after the Declaration-the
contrary position could certainly have been plausibly maintained as well. See supra note 59.
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cotton-found in neutral ships could be confiscated on other grounds,
principally for violation of the blockade. At the same time, however, without
violating the blockade, neutrals shipped vast quantities of Southern cotton back
to Europe-most importantly, via Matamoros, Mexico, which was across the
Rio Grande from Brownsville, Texas.62 It may be that ownership of some,
conceivably all, of this property was transferred to neutrals before being
loaded onto neutral ships, thereby exempting it from capture as enemy
property. Even were this the case, however, the United States, had it been
unwilling to recognize the doctrine, would have instructed its naval vessels at
least to search for enemy property on board neutral ships.63 Moreover, there
62 See, e.g., JAMES W. DADDYSMAN, THE MATAMOROS TRADE: CONFEDERATE COMMERCE,
DIPLOMACY, ANDINTRIGUE (1984); BERNATH, supra note42, at 34-36,70-71; O'ROURKE, supra
note 42, at 149-50. Located a short distance above the mouth of the Rio Grande and directly
across from Brownsville, Matamoros posed a key strategic difficulty for the Union. Under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo with Mexico, which provided for free navigation on the Rio
Grande, the United States could not lawfully impose a blockade at the mouth of the river, cutting
off trade with Matamoros. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. 28, 51 (1867); BERNATH, supra note 42,
at 36. This legal inhibition, which the United States never challenged and which the Supreme
Court affirmed, left a gaping hole in the blockade through which Southern cotton and contraband
easily flowed. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. at 51. The Confederates shipped cotton and other
goods overland to Brownsville and then by boat to Matamoros. British merchant ships, in turn,
unloaded munitions and other supplies at Matamoros and took on the Southern cotton for sale
in Europe. For accounts of the Matamoros trade, see, e.g., DADDYSMAN, supra, at 29-71;
BERNATH, supra note 42, at 34-36, 70-71; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 149-50. Moreover,
many neutral merchants, exploiting the protection which the neutral Mexican waters outside the
mouth of the Rio Grande afforded them to avoid capture, engaged in blockade running up and
down the Texas coast when conditions were auspicious. DADDYSMAN, supra, at 163-65, 171.
At the outset of the war, Matamoros was a sleepy town visited by a half dozen merchant
ships a year. Shortly after the beginning of the war, it became "the great commercial
thoroughfare of the Southern states." BERNATH, supra note 42, at 34. By April 1863, there were
a 180 to 200 vessels a month anchored in the vicinity awaiting unloading. By 1864, there were
200 to 300 ships, see id. at 35, and by January 1865, according to a contemporary account,
"Matamoros [had become] to the rebellion west of the Mississippi what New York is to the
United States-its great commercial and financial center, feeding and clothing the rebellion,
arming and equipping, furnishing it materials of war and a specie basis of circulation in Texas
that has almost entirely displaced Confederate Paper." Id. at 35 (quoting contemporaneous
internal Union army correspondence). For a full account of the magnitude of the Matamoros
trade, see DADDYSMAN, supra note 62, at 22-25, 29-35, 159-61.
63 On the contrary, however, Secretary of the Navy Welles issued successively narrower and
less ambiguous instructions to his officers in the Matamoros area and pointedly refused to
authorize the seizure of enemy property on neutral vessels. See, e.g., 1 SAVAGE, supra note 34,
450, reprinting The Secretary of the Navy (Welles) to Flag Officers Commanding Squadrons and
Officers Commanding Cruisers, Aug. 18, 1862 (directing that a vessel is not to be seized unless
it is reasonable
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would almost certainly have been instances in which it could plausibly have
challenged the bonafides of the claim to neutral ownership. That it chose not
to do so, permitting neutral vessels to return to Europe without challenge on
this ground, strongly suggests its determination to abide by the free ships, free
goods rule.' Why, then, do Goldsmith and Posner focus on the Clyde incident
to believe that she is engaged in carrying contraband of war for or to the
insurgents, and to their ports directly or indirectly by transshipment, or
otherwise violating the blockade; and that if, after visitation and search, it
shall appear to your satisfaction that she is in good faith and without
contraband, actually bound and passing from one friendly or so-called neutral
port to another, and not bound or proceeding to or from a port in the
possession of the insurgents, then she can not be lawfully seized)
id.; BERNATH, supra note 42, at 51-56.
Had the United States be unwilling to uphold the free ships rule, Secretary Welles would
also presumably have issued general instructions to his naval officers to search neutral ships
anywhere in the vicinity of the South for enemy goods, e.g., cotton. As Goldsmith and Posner
emphasize, neutral ships successfully ran the blockade in large numbers. At least sometimes it
must have been impossible to seize a neutral for lack of sufficient evidence of blockade running.
In other cases, the U.S. navy was unable to establish a blockade of a particular port. As a result,
neutral ships trading in the port could not be seized for violation of an ineffective blockade. In
all these cases, it would have been to the U.S. advantage to have claimed the right to confiscate
enemy property onboard neutral ships, but, in accordance with the free ships, free goods rule,
it refrained. Indeed, in view of the legal doubts about the effectiveness of the blockade in
general, Welles had every reason to supplement the claimed right to seize neutral ships for
blockade running with an independent claim to the right to seize their cargo as enemy property.
' Without doubt, the Matamoros trade was a major irritant to the United States, and, in a
number of cases, U.S. naval officers, acting without legal justification, seized neutral vessels
anchored near the mouth of the Rio Grande. For accounts of the various incidents and their
diplomatic and legal fallout, see, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42, at 37-41, 48-61; O'ROURKE,
supra note 42, at 125-29; DADDYSMAN, supra note 62, at 161-68. Their aim may have been to
disrupt the trade, see BERNATH, supra note 42, at 48-62, although they were certainly concerned
as well about blockade running by neutral ships shielded from capture while anchored in nearby
Mexican waters. See DADDYSMAN, supra note 62, at 163-65, 171. Be that as it may, if that was
their aim, the U.S. officers succeeded, at best, only for short periods of time. As noted above,
the Matamoros trade grew exponentially despite these efforts. Moreover, the U.S. government
officially disclaimed any right to seize vessels engaged in legitimate neutral trade with
Matamoros, and the ships taken as prize were released and, in some cases, damages were
awarded for the unlawful conduct of U.S. naval officers. See, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42, at
37-61; O'ROuRKE, supra note 42, at 125-29; DADDYSMAN, supra note 62, at 161-68. For
further discussion of the Matamoros incidents, see supra notes 61-62; infra notes 71, 102.
It is noteworthy that, had the executive branch wished to seize enemy property in neutral
ships, it could have done so without challenge in the prize courts, at least according to the most
knowledgeable authority on the issue. See WHEATON, supra note 34, § 475 n.223, at 613 (note
by Richard Henry Dana, lead counsel for the United States in prize matters during the Civil
War). As Dana explained, the executive could not rely on the courts to release enemy property.
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(never mind their incomplete statement of the facts) and ignore this related but
more problematic feature of the U.S. practice for their purposes?
Similar difficulties arise when we turn from the free ships, free goods rule
to the core of Goldsmith and Posner' s claims. They emphasize that the United
States changed positions on the rules pertaining to blockades, embracing a
more liberal rule than it had in the past, as well as on the continuous voyage
doctrine, which it had previously condemned.65 They fail to note, however,
that the U.S. positions prior to the Civil War on these controversial doctrines
were not universally accepted, certainly not by the British. Thus, despite
Goldsmith and Posner's insinuations to the contrary, it is far from clear that the
U.S. switch caused it to act in violation of existing customary international
law. Rather, the United States was, for the most part, simply adopting the
British approach, which had in fact prevailed throughout the first half of the
nineteenth century and under which the United States had suffered.66 Indeed,
when U.S. diplomats defended U.S. actions, and the U.S. courts upheld them,
they relied heavily and sometimes exclusively on British precedents (generally
Instead, it.could carry out its commitment not to seize enemy property in neutral ships only "by
instructions to the navy not to capture in such cases, and, if captures should be made, by
directing a restitution before adjudication." Id. He noted, however, that "[n]o case is reported
of a condemnation, in opposition to [the free ships rule], during the civil war." Id.
6 For an extended discussion of U.S. views prior to the Civil War, see, e.g., 1 SAVAGE,
supra note 34, at 1-86. On the continuous voyage doctrine, see, e.g., O'ROURKE, supra note 42,
at 107-08. The change in the U.S. position in relation to the requirement that blockades be
effective and not merely paper was more complex than Goldsmith and Posner's discussion
suggests. The United States never deviated, at least as a matter of its official pronouncements,
from the widely accepted formulations of the effectiveness requirement and, in particular, from
the formulation incorporated into the Declaration of Paris. See, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42,
at 11-12; 1 SAVAGE, supra note 34, at 87-91 (1934). See also supra note 39. Indeed, in
commenting on the Declaration of Paris' provision on blockades five years before the Civil War,
Secretary of State Marcy acknowledged that it only restated the existing customary international
law standard without doing anything to settle longstanding disputes over how to apply the
standard in particular settings: "What force is requisite to constitute a blockade remains as
unsettled and as questionable as it was before the Congress at Paris adopted the 'Declaration.' "
1 SAVAGE, supra note 34, at 381, 383, reprinting The Secretary of State (Marcy) to the French
Minister (Sartiges), July 28, 1856. To the extent that the United States adopted a new position
during the Civil War, it was reflected, more subtly, in the practical interpretation of the accepted
standard, with the United States implicitly endorsing an interpretation that Madison would have
rejected at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. For Secretary of State Seward's defense of the
effectiveness of the blockade, see id. at 440; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 90.
6 For an extended treatment of the neutrality disputes between the United States and Great
Britain during the Napoleonic Wars, see BRADFORD PERKINS, PROLOGUE TO WAR: ENGLAND
AND THE UNITED STATES 1805-1812 (1961). See also O'ROUnKE, supra note 42, at 83-86.
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the opinions of Sir William Scott, which, in fact, they had relied upon
throughout the nineteenth century).67 Thus, while the United States might
plausibly be charged with hypocrisy (although it had some powerful replies,
as I discuss below), it is less clear that it could fairly be charged with
illegality.
68
More importantly, Goldsmith and Posner neglect to mention that the British
government did not object to the U.S. measures. On the contrary, it virtually
welcomed the shift in U.S. position and publicly defended the legality of the
U.S. blockade of the Southern ports and its use of the continuous voyage
doctrine.69 It is noteworthy, moreover, that the British accepted the legality of
the U.S. measures despite the British tilt towards the South during much of the
war.7" There were, in fact, many legal disputes between Great Britain and the
United States during the war, but none over the crucial issues which Goldsmith
and Posner emphasize. Goldsmith and Posner also fail to mention that the U.S.
courts throughout the war frequently found that overzealous naval officers had
acted illegally in taking British merchant ships as prize and ordered the ships
released and, in some cases, awarded damages for the illegality.'
67 For the reliance of the Supreme Court on British precedents, which occurred in numerous
prize cases decided during the Civil War, see, e.g., The Peterhoff, 78 U.S. at 52-56; The
Bermuda, 70 U.S. 514, 554-57 (1866). On the importance of the British precedents both in
internal U.S. and British discussions and in their diplomatic exchanges during the war, see, e.g.,
BERNATH, supra note 42, at 71-73, 76-78, 87-94, 123-29; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 81-86,
93-97, 124-25, 129-33; Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 527 & n.40, 529-30. For
constant references to the British precedents throughout the first half of the nineteenth century,
see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
" Goldsmith and Posner assert in passing that the United States also adopted "an
unprecedentedly broad conception of... contraband." GOLDSMITH & POsNER, supra note 1, at
47. It is unclear what the basis for this claim is, and they cite no authority on this point.
Bernath, the principal authority on which they rely, concludes that "[t]he Union government's
interpretation of goods considered contraband did not, on the whole, deviate from that of
England and other Western nations." BERNATH, supra note 42, at 3 n.*.
' See, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42, at 11-12, 67-69, 76-78, 87-89, 93-94, 160-61;
O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 115-16, 145, 149-50; BRIGGS, supra note 41, at 67-68; Baxter,
British Opinions, supra note 42, at517-18; Baxter, British Government, supra note 42, at 11-13.
For a discussion of the British precedents on the effectiveness requirement, including Lord
Russell's defense of the U.S. blockade, see The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510,513-18 (1899).
70 See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 67-75, 88-89, 151-57; O'RoURKE, supra, at 119, 146-52.
7' For discussion of a number of these cases, including the Labuan, the Will-o'-the-Wisp,
the Adela, the Magicienne, the Sir William Peel, the Science, the Volante, the Dashing Wave,
the Matamoros, and the Mont Blanc, see, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42, at 37-40, 48-58, 113;
O'RoURKE, supra note 42, at 125-29, 131-33.
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Equally significant but unmentioned is the fact that after the war the United
States and Britain agreed in the Treaty of Washington to submit disputed cases
on both sides to international arbitration." The British chose to submit only
a relatively small number of cases, and, in most instances, the actions of the
United States were upheld as lawful by the mixed arbitration panels. In only
a small number of exceptional cases was the United States found to have acted
illegally and then the principal default was the failure of its courts to award
adequate damages for seizures which they had found to be illegal. Both sides
ultimately paid the judgments rendered against them in full. 73
It is true that many scholars, especially from countries that were supporters
of neutral rights, were outraged by the perceived hypocrisy of the United States
and strongly condemned the U.S. switch. They claimed that some of the U.S.
measures, particularly the application of the continuous voyage doctrine, were
illegal.74 But in view of the agreement between the affected parties, and the
outcome of the international arbitrations, those positions seem overstated at a
minimum and would appear to reflect the grave disappointment the scholars
felt at the abandonment of the pro-neutral rights position by the United States.
Neutral rights had been a kind of cause c6kbre among many writers, and they
viewed the U.S. measures as a potentially fatal blow to the progress which had
been achieved in 1856, when, in the Declaration of Paris, the major maritime
powers, including the British, had finally accepted the free ships, free goods
principle. Many had hoped that the Declaration was only the first step towards
a universal recognition of an immunity for all private property except
contraband from capture at sea.75 In light of Goldsmith and Posner' s emphasis
72 See Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863, 867-
68. The Treaty of Washington provided for arbitration of U.S. claims against Britain arising out
of the sale to the Confederacy of so-called commerce destroyers-most famously, the
Alabama-that preyed on U.S. naval and merchant ships during the Civil War and of British
claims against the United States arising out of the wartime neutrality disputes.
" BERNATH, supra note 42, at 43-44, 48-50, 59-61, 82, 94; BRIGGS, supra note 41, at 68;
Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 527 & n.40; 7 MOORE, supra note 33, § 1261, at 725-
26.
74 See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 91-93; BRIGGS, supra note 41, at 73-79; 7 MOORE, supra
note 33, § 1261, at 727-38 (excerpting extensively from the voluminous critical commentary).
The greatest controversy was over the Supreme Court's decision in The Springbok, 72 U.S. 1
(1867), which affirmed the continuous voyage doctrine in the context of a breach of blockade.
Among other criticisms, writers pointed to its inconsistency with the principle that blockades
must be of specific ports and its evidentiary presumptions, which, they argued, endangered
legitimate neutral trade.
" Indeed, the very reason that the United States refused to ratify the Declaration was its
failure to adopt such an immunity, notwithstanding the U.S. proposal to that effect. More
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on the purely bilateral character of customary international law norms,
moreover, it is noteworthy that these writers clearly perceived the United
States' abandonment of the pro-neutral rights position as a major new obstacle
to the realization of their project.7 6 If we take Goldsmith and Posner seriously,
these writers, in fact, had no reason for concern, because the Civil War
questions were purely bilateral matters between the United States and Great
Britain having no implications for other states.77
These additional facts, at a minimum, reveal a radically different
perspective on the Civil War history from the one which Goldsmith and Posner
offer. But this is only the beginning of the problems which a more serious
historical effort would have uncovered. Perhaps most significant are the
reasons for the British acceptance of the legality of the U.S. measures. From
their public statements as well as from their private correspondence it is clear
that high British officials-including Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, and
Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary-believed that the precedents established
by the U.S. measures would serve British interests in future wars, not only with
regard to the United States but also with regard to states more generally.78
particularly, the United States viewed the Declaration's first article outlawing privateering as
unacceptable unless tied to such a general immunity. See WHEATON, supra note 34, § 475 n.223,
at 608.
76 On Goldsmith and Posner's claim that customary international law is generally bilateral
rather than universal in character, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 35-39.
77 It is also noteworthy that many of these scholars were leading diplomatic figures of the
time.
78 See, e.g., Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 517-18,523,527-29 & n.40, 533-34;
Baxter, British Government, supra note 42, at 9-13, 22; BERNATH, supra note 42, at 11-12, 67-
69, 71-73, 76-78, 87-94. As Baxter put it:
Although Great Britain and the United States had for once exchanged their
traditional roles of belligerent and neutral, both governments saw clearly that
the precedents they were making would have great weight in a future war,
when British prize courts would cite the new American decisions to justify
British interference with the rights of American neutral shippers. Both the
precedents of the British past, and the future interests of British sea power
alike dictated decisions favoring the belligerent who was dominant at sea.
Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 517-18. The British Solicitor General, Sir Roundell
Palmer, offered a similar explanation to Parliament:
England has as strong an interest as any Power in the world in understanding
well what she is about, when she is invited to take a step that may hereafter
be quoted against herself, and may make it impossible for her, with honour
or consistency, to avail herself of her superiority at sea.
Baxter, British Government, supra note 42, at 13. The London Times agreed: "England is too
great to be often neutral, and should not forget that the arguments she might now employ against
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Their belief that solidifying their interpretation of the law of nations would
have a significant impact on future practice strongly suggests the efficacy of
customary international law and its capacity to provide the focal point for a
long-term and reasonably stable cooperative equilibrium. Moreover, the Prime
Minister and his Foreign Secretary did not adopt this position lightly. There
was tremendous domestic political pressure on them---in part because of
widespread British sympathy for the South, in part because of the tremendous
profits at stake, and in part because of British confidence in the strength of the
Royal Navy-to condemn the U.S. position and take effective action.79 They
sternly resisted all such pressure, keeping what they believed to be the long run
interests of Britain in view.80
her neighbour might, we know not how soon, be retorted against herself with all the force of
admissions." Id. at 12 (quoting from the Times).
Britain's vital concern about the precedential force of its actions was evident in a wide
range of matters and led it to pursue self-denying policies as a neutral even in the face of
powerful temptations to pursue short term advantage. This concern was, of course, reflected in
its embrace of the U.S. blockade despite its at least arguable ineffectiveness and of the
continuous voyage doctrine. But it was manifested in many other areas as well. Consider, for
example, the British government's punctiliousness in instructing its far superior fleet to refrain
from interfering with the U.S. navy's exercise of belligerent rights, even in cases where the
legality of the U.S. conduct was highly doubtful. In all but the most extreme circumstances, the
government insisted that disputes would have be resolved in the first instance in the prize courts
of the belligerent party (i.e., the United States). See Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at
523. Likewise, even as Britain was complaining bi.tterly over U.S. abuses of its territorial waters
in the Bahamas and elsewhere, it went to great lengths to ensure that its officers refrained from
taking any action against U.S. ships outside the three mile limit of its territorial sea. See id. at
527-29. Admiral Milne, the remarkable British commanding officer in the area, repeatedly
insisted that the three mile limit had not been changed notwithstanding technological
developments that enabled cannon shot to reach the shore from greater distances, and he
censured British officers who violated this restriction. See id. at 528-29. Milne also strictly
maintained the traditional British opposition to the disputed neutral right of convoy and, again,
dressed down one of his officers who, seeking to protect British merchant ships, acted
inconsistently with the past British understanding. See id. at 528 & nn.40, 41. Milne explained,
in a note to Lord Lyons, the British Minister in Washington, that "it would be highly undesirable
to provoke by any act on our part, a discussion on so controverted a question of international law
as that of the right of convoy by neutrals," and he was upheld in this view by Lyons, the
Admiralty, and the Foreign Office. Id. at 527 n.41. There were many other similar incidents.
9 For accounts of the domestic political situation and the harsh attacks on Palmerston and
Russell, both in Parliament, by merchant interests, and by the press, see BERNATH, supra note
42, at 67-69,73-75, 88-89, 119-20, 151-57; O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 115-19, 145-50, 190-
200.
'0 Their assessment, moreover, proved correct. In the decades following the Civil War,
including during World War I, the leading decisions of the Supreme Court upholding the U.S.
measures were constantly cited by British diplomats and prize courts in defense of British
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Nor were the British officials alone in holding this-if we are to take
Goldsmith and Posner seriously--delusion. Leading British papers, for
example, took the long term view, even while other papers pressed the
government hard and voiced their opposition vociferously."' For their part, the
Americans concurred in this attitude towards the law of nations. Secretary of
State Seward and President Lincoln were keenly aware of the potential
implications of the precedents they were setting and took care to consider the
impact on the post-War position of the United States when it would return to
its accustomed state of neutrality. 2 At one crucial juncture, when the U.S. and
Britain were on the verge of war over the Peterhoff affair-and Secretary of
State Seward and Secretary of the Navy Welles were at loggerheads, a
common state of affairs-Seward successfully appealed to Lincoln in a private
memorandum to concede the pro-neutral British position. According to
Seward, if the United States persisted, it would set "an unanswerable"
precedent (in relation to the (lack of) immunity of mail steamers) which would
harm future U.S. interests.83 As we have already seen, this was also the
overriding concern of the many writers on the law of nations who criticized the
U.S. measures."
Beyond these points, the historical records reveal the power the law of
nations had in framing and often in resolving the disputes that arose. 5 To be
actions. Baxter cites many World War I examples, including some of the most consequential
diplomatic exchanges and prize court decisions during the Great War. See Baxter, British
Opinions, supra note 42, at 517 & n.1. The decisions were cited in many earlier controversies
as well and not only by the British.
8' For examples of both, see, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42, at 67-69,73-76, 88-89, 119-20,
151-55; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 119, 145-50.
82 Baxter makes this claim forcefully, observing that "[n]o mere love of consistency, or
momentary interest in diminishing friction with neutrals, led Seward to oppose the adoption by
the United States of extreme belligerent pretensions." Baxter, British Government, supra note
42, at 9.
" Seward's Report on Neutral Mails, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in James P. Baxter, Il, ed.,
Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865, 34 AM. HIST. REV. 77, 87 (1928).
In closing his argument, Seward observed: "It is also obvious that any belligerent claim which
we make during the existing war, will be urged against us as an unanswerable precedent when
[we] may ourselves be at peace." Id. (brackets in original). Ironically, although the United
States and Great Britain nearly came to blows over the issue-and Seward gave the British the
concession they were demanding-the British government quickly rethought the issue, and,
precisely out of a concern over the future implications which had moved Seward and Lincoln,
began to backtrack on its position. See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 72-73.
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
83 A particularly striking example was the sharp internal debate in Lincoln's cabinet over
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
sure, the United States, engaged in an existential struggle for its existence, was
tempted to push the limits and did so skillfully in many cases, for example by
quietly tolerating illegal acts, then promising to correct the mistakes made and
prevent future repetitions, but in fact delaying long enough to discourage the
more timid British merchants from attempting to supply the South with
military hardware and purchase its cotton. 6 Nevertheless, the law of nations
which legal mechanism to use to shut down trade through the Southern ports. There were two
options available for achieving the same end: The President could invoke a domestic, or
"municipal," law declaring the ports closed or, alternatively, he could impose an international
law blockade. The debate largely hung on the different international law implications which
would flow from the choice of one or the other method. The municipal law approach would
close the ports without any requirement that an effective blockade be established and would
allow the United States to impose criminal sanctions on any violators it arrested. However, it
would not permit the United States to search and seize neutral vessels on the high seas for having
violated, or for intent to violate, the law. Violators would have to be arrested while in U.S.
territorial waters. Moreover, this approach would tempt the British and French to recognize the
Confederacy as a means of undermining the legal force of the municipal closure. Once the South
was recognized, U.S. law, as far as other countries were concerned, would cease to have force
over the territory of the Confederacy. In contrast, an international law blockade would permit
searches and seizures of neutral vessels on the high seas and, since a blockade was a legitimate
act of war whether against a rebellious province or a recognized enemy state, would avoid giving
the British and French an incentive to recognize the Confederacy. It would not, however, permit
the imposition of criminal sanctions on blockade runners, and it would mean that the United
States navy had to achieve at least minimal compliance with the international law effectiveness
standard. Ultimately, although repeatedly threatening to adopt the municipal law approach, and
obtaining an Act of Congress giving it the necessary authority, the Administration decided to
limit itself to the international law blockade instead. For discussion of the sharp internal
controversy over the issue, the hostility between Seward and Welles which it generated, and the
surrounding diplomatic debates, see O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 91-101.
86 At least this is how Bernath-with little direct evidence of either cooperation among the
executive and judicial branches or of high level executive branch responsibility for illegal acts
of officers on the ground-interprets the relevant events. See, e.g., BERNATH, supra note 42, at
45-46, 57, 62. Nor were these efforts terribly successful. For further discussion of this point,
see supra notes 62, 64.
It would be a mistake, moreover, to evaluate the U.S. conduct in this respect in isolation
from the larger events of the war. Not only was Great Britain tolerating, and to some extent
encouraging, the blockade runners, but it also failed to prevent the construction and sale of
powerful warships to Confederate agents, most famously the Alabama and the other so-called
ironclads. These ships wreaked enormous damage to U.S. merchant shipping and to the U.S.
navy, and the U.S. position was that at least the latter activities constituted abuses of neutrality
and violations of U.S. rights under the law of nations, a position that was upheld by the
arbitration tribunals established under the Treaty of Washington. Although the U.S. government
seems not to have attempted to justify U.S. actions as legitimate retaliatory measures, it would
be naive not to view some U.S. actions through this lens.
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was a constant concern on both sides and, once its requirements were made
reasonably clear, frequently ended further debate.8 7
The British government was particularly careful to consider the legal
implications of any doubtful issue that arose, submitting almost all
controversial questions to the Law Officers of the Crown, among whom were
leading authorities on the law of nations. The Law Officers, in turn, wrote
elaborate confidential opinions which the government generally followed."8
Moreover, Admiral Milne, the British commander in charge of the Caribbean
fleet, was deeply knowledgeable about the law of nations and was constantly
instructing his officers to comply strictly with the law of nations and insisting
that they show restraint even in the face of provocations by zealous American
naval officers.8 9 He also frequently corresponded with the Foreign Office to
8" Citing Bernath and O'Rourke, Goldsmith and Posner assert that Seward was "indifferent
to customary international law or tried to manipulate its requirements for strategic purposes" and
that Welles was "ignorant or disdainful of customary international law." GOLDSMITH & POSNER,
supra note 1, at 48. These comments, however, are clearly exaggerated at best, and, to the extent
they are based upon Bernath and O'Rourke, cannot be properly understood out of the larger
context in which they were made. As I have illustrated throughout, the accounts of both authors
reveal the considerable weight which both Seward and Welles placed on compliance with
international law. In fact, throughout the war, Seward and Welles (often with the involvement
of other cabinet officials) engaged in heated and extended debates about the requirements of
international law and, on more than one occasion, brought their conflicting views on the legal
issues in writing directly to Lincoln's attention, forcing him to resolve some of the most
consequential questions of the war. See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 71-73; O'RoURKE, supra
note 42, at 93-99, 141-45; Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 523-27. The comments
of Bernath and O'Rourke upon which Goldsmith and Posner rely are best understood in light of
their starting assumption, which is exactly the opposite of Goldsmith and Posner's: that states
comply with international law because it is law. Their comments reflect their surprise at finding
that self-interest sometimes overrides the commitment to comply.
88 For many examples, see BERNATH, supra note 42, at 48-49, 71-73, 76, 78, 87-88, 93-94,
123-25; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 60,92-93, 95-97, 115-16; Baxter, British Opinions, supra
note 42, at 518-22, 529-30, 533-34; Baxter, British Government, supra note 42, at 17-19. One
of the Law Officers during much of the Civil War was Sir Robert Phillimore, who was among
the leading British publicists on international law. See Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42,
at 518. For Phillimore's three volume treatise, see SIR ROBERT PHIIJJMORE, COMMENTARIES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1854).
The British government was willing to recognize the lawfulness of the exercise of some
belligerent rights, like privateering, which it had long bitterly opposed. For discussion, see
Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 534-37.
89 On Milne's consequential role in avoiding war between the United States and Britain and
on his insistence on strict compliance with the British understanding of international law, see
Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 518, 523, 527 & nn.40, 41, 527-29; Baxter, British
Government, supra note 42, at 17-19, 21-23.
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debate and clarify questions concerning the law of nations, expressing worry
when he found potentially conflicting opinions taken by the British in previous
engagements, including with other states. 9°
Precedents were also given strong weight on both sides. The existence of
prior decisions by the courts, mostly by Sir William Scott, were particularly
effective in shifting the balance,9 but the Americans found themselves in an
embarrassing position on a number of occasions when the British brought past
U.S. court decisions inconsistent with the current U.S. position to their
attention." Seward, for example, found himself in a difficult bind in arguing
the illegality of the British government's recognition of the Confederacy as a
belligerent party under the law of nations-a crucial issue in Seward's
mind-when he was informed of past Supreme Court opinions apparently to
the contrary, including one written by Justice Story.9 3
Worse still was the serious difficulty he found himself in with regard to
France when a diplomatic slip by the U.S. Ambassador to London, Charles
Adams, seemed to reveal that the U.S. was taking an inconsistent position on
neutral duties in France's war with Mexico. To save face with both Britain
and France, Seward was forced to reprimand Adams and distance the U.S.
government from his actions, a highly unpleasant duty.94 Moreover, a similar
problem arose later when U.S. citizens, sympathetic to the Mexican rebellion,
wished to provide aid to the Mexicans. Despite intense Republican sympathy
in the United States for the Mexican cause, Seward took the political heat and
forced a cessation of any activities in relation to Mexico which he was
claiming, in the case of British aid to the South, violated the law of nations.95
I A particularly noteworthy example was MiMe's concern about whether the extent of the
territorial sea around the Bahamas was to be measured only from the inhabited islands or also
from some uninhabited coral reefs eight miles from shore. Milne pointed out that Palmerston
had some years before denied that Spain could lawfully claim a three mile territorial sea around
uninhabited caves and rocks off the coast of Cuba. Milne's intervention led to an extended
debate within the British government and a full review of the international law authorities by the
Law Officers. See Baxter, British Opinions, supra note 42, at 529-30.
" For discussion of Scott's influence, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
92 See O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 56-58, 86-88 (discussing the diplomatic exchanges over
the Supreme Court's opinions in The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819); The
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283 (1822); and Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241 (1807)).
9 See O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 56-58. Seward was forced to argue that the British and
French recognition of the South's belligerent status had been premature rather than illegal per
se.
94 See O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 146-49; BERNATH, supra note 42, at 73-75. This was
a serious diplomatic faux pas and nearly cost the United States dearly.
91 See O'RouKE, supra note 42, at 183-88.
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Another particularly striking example occurred at the end of a heated
diplomatic row between Ambassador Adams and Lord Russell over an incident
in which a captured British merchant ship was recaptured by its British crew
while it was being taken in for adjudication as prize and then sailed to a hero's
welcome in Liverpool flying the South Carolina flag. The case was a deep
embarrassment to the United States, and Adams argued forcefully that
international law required the British to return the vessel to U.S. control. In
reply, Russell (apparently correctly) rejected Adams' interpretation of
international law and earlier opinions by Sir William Scott and refused to
budge.96 When Adams discovered in the volumes of the American State
Papers several similar cases from 1799 in which American crews had
recaptured vessels from their British captors and in which the United States
had rejected any international law obligation to return the vessel to the British,
Adams immediately informed Russell of the precedents and ended the
diplomatic exchange.97
Before closing, let me return to the charge, which has been made by many,
that the United States was hypocritical in abandoning the pro-neutral rights
positions which it had earlier championed. Goldsmith and Posner seem only
too happy to embrace this view, and they present it as important evidence
supporting their claims. For the reasons I have now explained at length, this
emphasis only distracts attention from far more important aspects of the Civil
War neutrality disputes. Still, it is worth observing that the charge of
hypocrisy is, upon reflection, far less compelling than it might seem at first
blush.
Because of both special geographical considerations and technological
developments, the circumstances of the Civil War were importantly different
from those of most past wars and made the U.S. measures, notwithstanding
prior U.S. positions, easy to understand and perhaps to endorse as
interpretations of the law of nations. Consider first the blockade of the
Southern ports, which was a crucial part of the Union war effort. The South
was highly dependent on exports of cotton by ship to earn proceeds and
imports by ship to obtain weaponry and other materiel essential to its military
success. One of Lincoln's first acts after Fort Sumter was to declare blockades
of the Southern ports. However, Lincoln did not claim that the blockades
96 See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 119-29; O'ROuRKE, supra note 42, at 129-3 1.
9 See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 128-29; O'RouRKE, supra note 42, at 130-31.
Apparently, Seward agreed that the discovery was a sufficient basis to close the matter. See
O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 131.
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became legally effective upon their announcement but, instead, following the
law of nations, made them effective only after U.S. warships actually patrolled
outside each particular port and gave notice to neutral merchant ships of the
initiation of the blockade, leaving any neutral ships in port adequate time to
depart.98 By posting warships in the waters outside each of the blockaded
ports, the United States refrained from imposing a "paper blockade" and
attempted to comply at least minimally with the requirements of customary
international law.99 In the formulation of the Declaration of Paris, a blockade,
to be valid, "must be effective-that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy,"'" a standard which was
generally interpreted as not requiring that access be entirely cut off but that the
blockading squadron present an evident danger to neutral vessels attempting
to enter the blockaded port.''
It is true that, especially in the early phases of the war, the blockade was
leaky. This was due, in part, to the fact that the Union navy had only a limited
(though quickly growing) number of warships which had to be stretched thinly
in order to maintain a real blockade of all of the Southern ports. But it was
also due in significant measure to accidents of geography and to then recent
technological advances which had greatly increased the speed of small ships,
propelled by steam engine, and thereby their ability to outrun standard naval
warships. The Confederate government, in league with British merchants and
shippers, sought to take advantage of the fact that the Confederate states were
ringed by neutral offshore islands-most importantly, the ports at Nassau and
Bermuda-and the neutral port at Matamoros, Mexico. Before the war, these
ports were sleepy outposts, but once war broke out, they quickly became
98 See 1 SAVAGE, supra note 34, at 87-88, 415-28; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 91-92, 109-
12.
" See 1 SAVAGE, supra note 34, at 91,439-42; BERNATH, supra note 42, at 11-12; Baxter,
British Government, supra note 42, at 12. See supra notes 39, 65 and accompanying text.
00 Declaration of Paris of 1856, art. 4.
'0' For Lord Russell's embrace of this interpretation, see BERNATH, supra note 42, at 11 -12;
Baxter, British Government, supra note 42, at 12. Lord Russell declared:
assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships
is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent
access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that
these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various
ships may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular instances
here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective
one by international law ....
Baxter, supra, at 12. For further discussion, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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thriving commercial emporiums. They were, in fact, way stations for the
shipment of contraband and cotton to and from the Confederate states. British
merchants would ship their goods to these "neutral" ports as a strategic
maneuver to enhance the prospects of successfully running the blockade.
Frequently, British goods were simply brought to these ports and then
transshipped, in neutral waters, onto swift steam propelled blockade runners
which, taking advantage of technological advances, specialized in outrunning
the blockading squadron.' °2
In this context, it is certainly reasonable that the U.S. government would
not view shipping through these offshore islands as legitimate "neutral" trade
and, likewise, would not feel compelled to concede the failure of the blockade,
because professional blockade runners launching from nearby islands were
able to get past the blockading squadrons with some frequency.1 13 It is also
understandable that it would not view the blockade as violating the spirit of
customary international law even if it was arguably in violation of rules for
which the United States had advocated in different contexts. This is especially
so, because the blockade, even if it could be penetrated by small blockade
runners, was actually highly effective in reducing the levels of Southern
exports and imports. Moreover, the blockade clearly did make it "dangerous"
for neutrals to attempt to enter the blockaded ports. That is presumably why
it was generally the blockade runners who were willing to take the risk and
why wages for blockade runners were running at phenomenally high levels
during the war.' 4
"o BERNATH, supra note 42, at 34-35, 70-71, 93-98; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 116-18,
149-50; DADDYSMAN, supra note 62, at 22-25, 29-35, 151-55, 159-61; JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY,
THE BLOCKADE AND THE CRUISERS chapter 2 (1883), available at http://www.civilwarhome.
com/blockade.htm. For further discussion, see supra note 62 and accompanying text. The
Matamoros trade was effective in undermining the blockade because of the town's geographical
location across the Rio Grande from Brownsville. In contrast to Nassau and Bermuda, however,
the United States, at least in theory, had more options for countering the impact of the
Matamoros trade. Seward long advocated that the Union army occupy Brownsville as a means
of cutting off the trade, and, for a short time, the army did manage to oust the Confederates from
the city. However, this success only pushed the trade further up the Rio Grande, and, in any
case, it soon proved impossible for the Union army to hold Brownsville. As a result,
Confederate rule was restored and, along with it, the Matamoros trade. See BERNATH, supra note
42, at 40-41; O'ROURKE, supra note 42, at 118 -19, 125-26; DADDYSMAN, supra note 62, at 91-
99.
"03 Although it was unwilling to act to prevent blockade running, the British government
frequently expressed sympathy for U.S. actions for precisely these reasons. See, e.g., BERNATH,
supra note 42, at 95, 163; Baxter, British Government, supra note 42, at 22-23.
104 See 1 SAVAGE, supra note 34, at 439-42; BERNATH, supra note 42, at 3-4; SOLEY, supra
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The same background also explains why the United States embraced, and,
arguably, extended, the old British doctrine of continuous voyage. Given the
geographical and technological advantages held by the blockade runners, the
U.S. government decided that it could more effectively enforce the blockade
by attempting to capture not only blockade runners coming from offshore ports
like Nassau but also neutral merchant ships on their way to these offshore
ports. These merchant vessels were laden with goods, including contraband,
destined for the Confederacy. Indeed, that was often the whole purpose of
their voyage, and their shipments provided the lifeline the Confederacy needed
to continue the war effort. Under these circumstances, it hardly seems
unreasonable that the United States decided to cease affording them
unhindered passage into places like Nassau where they could take advantage
of the port's neutral status to unload their goods onto blockade runners waiting
for an opportune moment to sneak past the blockading squadron. From this
vantage point, the United States had compelling reasons to claim that the
British merchants were engaged in fraud not legitimate neutral trade and that
customary international law-whatever the United States had previously
claimed in different circumstances-should not be interpreted to grant them
immunity for this kind of conduct.'0 5
note 102, available at http://www.civilwarhome.com/blockade.htm.
"o See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 93-94, 97-98; W. ARNOLD-FORSTER, THE NEwFREEDoM
OFTHE SEAS 31-32 (1942). As Bernath observes:
The change in American legal thinking and the expansion of English
doctrine by American courts seemed immoral to some and illegal to others.
But what took place was merely the application of a well-established principle
to a new state of facts-the doctrine of continuous voyage applied and
expanded to meet the needs of the United States during its Civil War.
A change in circumstances, the employment for the first time of fast steam-
driven vessels designed to run a blockade, departures of neutral vessels and
cargoes from neutral ports close to an enemy, neutral cargoes arriving at a
port directly across the border from an enemy and intended for that
enemy---all of these factors influenced the decision to utilize advantageously
the doctrine of continuous voyage.
BERNATH, supra note 42, at 97-98. "[T]he employment of the doctrine," Bernath concludes,
"was only fair to [the United States]." Id. at 96.
Indeed, what is perhaps more surprising than the United States' adoption of the continuous
voyage doctrine is the modesty with which the United States actually employed it. It appears to
have been utilized only in a small number of spectacular cases; more often the government did
not rely upon it at all. See BERNATH, supra note 42, at 62, 96. Moreover, it is important to
recognize the limited scope of the rule as a means of cutting off neutral trade. As interpreted by
the Supreme Court, it applied only to goods which were destined to a blockaded port or, in the
case of contraband, to the Confederacy as a whole. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. 28, 54-59 (1867);
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I do not mean to deny that the United States may plausibly be charged with
hypocrisy. My point, rather, is that a fuller understanding of the circumstances
reveals that the United States had many compelling reasons to alter its position
on these legal questions and that the opposite claim-that the United States
was fully justified in changing its position-is at least equally plausible. This
is especially so because, as previously discussed, the British did not object and
because it is far from clear, in view of the longstanding disputes over these
doctrines, that the United States was actually acting in violation of customary
international law. Few would deny that customary international law does, and
should, change in response to changing circumstances. In this connection, it
is perhaps worthwhile to note that in the decades following the Civil War,
further advances in technology placed increasingly intense pressure on the
traditional neutrality regime and that by World War I, with the advent of
submarines and industrial total war, the legal regime was almost totally
outmoded.
To support their version of events, Goldsmith and Posner quote an historian
who notes the irony in the fact that following the Declaration of Paris the
United States was the first nation to move towards a more pro-belligerent
approach to customary international law: "By [an] irony of fate, the first
country to contribute to [the] stultification of the Free Ships rule was the very
state which had been the rule's most consistent champion-the United
States."1" Goldsmith and Posner neglect to mention that a few sentences later,
after briefly reviewing the Civil War history and the famous Supreme Court
decisions upholding the continuous voyage doctrine, the same author observes:
In making these reasonable claims, the Supreme Court was only
developing that 'doctrine of continuous voyage' which had been
accepted by Lord Stowell [a.k.a., Sir William Scott] in the
English Prize Court during the Napoleonic wars. Realizing the
The Springbok, 70 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1867); The Bermuda, 70 U.S. 514, 551-57 (1866). This
limitation meant that neutral trade to, for example, the Bahamas or to Matamoros, even in
contraband, could not be claimed as prize so long as there was to be a real intermediate sale to
an importer in the neutral port. It did not matter that the only buyer to whom the importer could
plausibly sell the imported items-often manufactured specifically to meet the requirements of
the Confederate army-was a Confederate agent. Thus, neutral traders would have had little
difficulty circumventing the rule. See The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. at 59; The Springbok, 70 U.S. at
25; The Bermuda, 72 U.S. at 551-52.
'0 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 48, quoting ARNOLD-FORSTER, supra note 105,
at 31 (brackets in Goldsmith and Posner).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
strength of the American case, the British Government, despite
pressure in England, wisely refused to support a protest against
these seizures.'0 7
In view of this more complete historical account, there are several points
which I underscore by way of summary:
First, Goldsmith and Posner's account of the Civil War is inadequate by
any measure. To put it bluntly: Their account is wrong on some points; is
incomplete and misleading in other crucial respects; fails to present a balanced
picture of the actual events or of their significance; and avoids confronting the
difficult challenges which a fairer presentation of the history raises for their
larger claims.
Second, even without further investigation, these findings are sufficient to
cast grave doubt upon their empirical case studies as a whole. There is simply
no reason to credit the findings of their other case studies in view of the flaws
which are so pervasive in their discussion of the Civil War. This is especially
so, because their methodological approach in general does not provide an
adequate basis upon which to draw historically sound conclusions. In any
case, although I cannot pursue the point here, my own research suggests that
similar flaws pervade other aspects of their case studies.
Third, the success of their project stands or falls upon the soundness of the
case studies. Without empirical confirmation, their models, even if
mathematically sound, are merely unsupported speculations.
Finally, the history recounted here permits some tentative conclusions
about customary international law (in the nineteenth century?). Most
importantly, it suggests the possibility that customary international law can
provide a relatively stable equilibrium which guides state behavior even in
areas where power and interest are most salient. It is possible that this effect
is due in part to international law's "compliance pull." Alternatively, it may
just reflect the scope of cooperative behavior that even purely self-interested
states can maintain under certain circumstances. Either way, the historical
evidence poses a profound challenge to Goldsmith and Posner's pessimistic
claims about the possibilities for customary international law.
107 ARNOLD-FORSTER, supra note 105, at 31-32.
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V. CONCLUSION
I have presented my assessment of The Limits of International Law
candidly and, in doing so, have perhaps been unduly critical. Certainly, the
book has many valuable insights, and its ambition to force international law
scholars to take seriously the limits which the real world imposes on their
normative reveries is welcome and urgently needed. Indeed, one can only
hope that the provocative character of the book will manage to penetrate the
powerful shield of denial which surrounds the discipline.
Still, the book's polemical character positively invites close scrutiny and
blunt criticism. I have attempted to offer both. I do so, however, in a
constructive vein, with the hope that my criticisms will provoke Goldsmith and
Posner to deepen their research and shore up the foundations for their project.
Undoubtedly, two such capable scholars will produce important advances in
the field.

